Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, (...) however, of several of Popper's key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony. Key Words: testimony • anti-justificationism • social epistemology • situational analysis • defeasibility. (shrink)

In Bangladesh due to improved quality of life the number of people over 60 years is increasing rapidly. This should be seen as an emerging challenge as the elderly will have special needs and require different care-giving services. Since Bangladesh does not have a social welfare system there will be competition for inadequate resources specially health and medical services. It is envisaged that due to more elderly population the demographic structure will undergo a slow change from the present pyramid structure. (...) The growing trend towards nuclear family or where children live abroad will put the elderly parents in a dilemma-the financial and social support that is essential for them has not yet emerged. The nutrition and health status of elderly people depend on adequate food safe water, proper sanitation facilities and maintaining hygienic standards. To provide special medical care for the elderly there is a need to establish WHO recommended Age-Friendly Primary Health Care centers and separate wards /units are to be set up in the hospitals. To reduce vulnerability of older women there is a need to distribute assets and properties according to the law.. Our new generations have to be responsive, informed and attentive about their duties and responsibilities towards the elderly people. Taking proper care of the elderly is our ethical duty and responsibility. (shrink)

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...) and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to illustrate the ethical foundations of psychoanalysis and to outline the ethical origins of Freudian theory. To this end, Jürgen Habermas' conception of knowledge-constitutive interests is discussed, which draws on psychoanalysis as an example of science justified in its form through an underlying emancipatory interest. The analysis of the position of the German philosopher is complemented by Charles Taylor's reflections on the sources of the contemporary conceptions of subjectivity and related ethical conceptions considered in (...) their relation to the history of the discourse on madness - including psychoanalysis. The research results in showing the continuing validity of the conception proposed by Freud in the context of the development of the philosophical theories of subjectivity, as well as more detailed, conceptual problems concerning mental disorders. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...) to be explained in terms of symbols (in a language of thought) and formal rules. The debate, with connectionism, has mostly centered on the second premise-whether an explanation of systematicity requires compositional structure, which neural networks do not to exhibit (for example, Hadley and Hayward, in Minds and Machines, 7:1–37). In this paper, I will take issue with the first premise. Several arguments will be deployed that show that cognition is not systematic in general; that, in fact, systematicity seems to be related to language. I will argue that it is just verbal minds that are systematic, and they are so because of the structuring role of language in cognition. A dual-process theory of cognition will be defended as the best explanation of the facts. (shrink)

In a classical paper [15] V. Glivenko showed that a proposition is classically demonstrable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically demonstrable. This result has an algebraic formulation: the double negation is a homomorphism from each Heyting algebra onto the Boolean algebra of its regular elements. Versions of both the logical and algebraic formulations of Glivenko’s theorem, adapted to other systems of logics and to algebras not necessarily related to logic can be found in the literature (see [2, (...) 9, 8, 14] and [13, 7, 14]). The aim of this paper is to offer a general frame for studying both logical and algebraic generalizations of Glivenko’s theorem. We give abstract formulations for quasivarieties of algebras and for equivalential and algebraizable deductive systems and both formulations are compared when the quasivariety and the deductive system are related. We also analyse Glivenko’s theorem for compatible expansions of both cases. (shrink)

This article focuses on some theoretical developments prompted by the use and construction of telescopes in the first half of the seventeenth century. It argues that today's notion of "scientific instrument" cannot be used to categorize these optical devices or explain their impact on natural philosophy. The article analyzes in historical terms the construction of conceptual references for the telescope as an instrument of a new kind, which possessed capabilities and working principles unlike those of traditional "mathematical instruments." It shows (...) that through the 1650s, in both rhetorical and explanatory terms, first-rank telescope makers, theoreticians, and astronomers found it useful to equate the telescope with the eye, suggesting that the data the telescope produced was as reliable as that obtained in naked-eye vision. Kepler's and Descartes' theory of the telescope will be shown to dovetail uncannily with this understanding of the telescope. (shrink)

The present article commences analyzing the origins and influences of the religious discourse on the configuration of the modern constitutional discourse and the contributions of the jus-positivism in the consolidation of this sacred-civil language. The second issue is the definition of the U.S. Constitution as a mixed and not as a democratic constitution, with regard to the influences of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Polybius to the Drafters of the first modern constitutional text; stability and equilibrium took preference over democracy in (...) a wide sense. I also analyze how the Drafter’s decision has conditioned the modern constitutional system up to the present. (shrink)

L’article passe en revue le développement de l’histoire des femmes au Moyen Âge en Espagne depuis ses origines, la fin des années 1970, et discute l’influence que les thèses de Georges Duby ont exercée sur elle. Il relève que les regards venus de l’étranger ont contribué à discréditer et faire abandonner les préoccupations nationalistes qui avaient longtemps obsédé l’historiographie autochtone jusque dans la façon d’envisager et représenter les femmes. Le long et fécond parcours de l’histoire des femmes dans les vingt (...) dernières années est alors examiné, depuis l’orientation fondamentalement juridique et positiviste qui a marqué ses débuts jusqu’aux recherches récentes sur l’identité et la subjectivité féminines ou aux polémiques sur le pouvoir des femmes et leur participaton à la vie politique. La portée des thèses de G. Duby dans cette évolution ainsi que les critiques qu’elles se sont attirées sont finalement considérées. (shrink)

After stressing the shortcomings of Darwinian accounts of self-consciousness and knowledge - i.e. in terms of their survival value - Anthony O'Hear presents Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses on cosmic evolution as an alternative approach that avoids those shortcomings. Although O'Hear does not straightforwardly defend Peirce's views, his argument suggests that only some teleological account of self-consciousness and knowledge is reasonable. The argument, though correct, is not enough to establish the metaphysical point O'Hear defends. Before developing his metaphysical ideas, Peirce's rejection of (...) natural selection as an explanation for every phenomenon brought him to consider the more appropriate question of how natural selection could give rise to a different kind of evolution. This involved outlining an evolutionary account of the origin of self-consciousness and of the mechanisms of belief fixation. The point is not one about Peirce, of course, but about the relationship between, on the one hand, biological and, on the other, psychological and cultural phenomena. (shrink)

The circumscribed quadrature of professional ethics aims to show the necessary shift from deontology to professional ethics, from deontological codes to ethical codes. While deontology and the deontological codes that materialise from it set their sights on professionals' responsibilities, professional ethics and the ethical codes that should derive from it would set their sights on the professional act, on its successful performance. In this way, the stress comes to be placed not only on the professional's responsibility, although that too, but (...) also on the necessary orchestration of the responsibilities shared at numerous levels by everyone involved in the performance of the professional act. The author identifies and typifies five elements present in the professional act. Four of them involve direct the protagonism of the professional, the recipient of the professional service, the institution that makes the service possible and from which the professionals' service is offered, and finally the human factor, the people who are behind the aforementioned factors and their nature, the professional, the recipient of the services and institutions. And each of these factors paves the way for a series of diversified protagonisms: inter-professional cooperation, receiver of professional services and their human environment around them, macro and micro institutions, diverse human profiles. However, all of this takes place within the framework of the fifth important element in professional ethics: a given, specific society as a circumscription of the four elements cited above, which sets the moral bar, a set of convictions and desired collective ethics which unquestionably also affect the performance of professional acts. With this reflection, we take note of the necessary co-responsibility in the provision of professional services, a co-responsibility which we could express simply in healthcare terms: it is not enough to merely have sound healthcare professionals if we do not have good patients with favourable affective environments, nor sound healthcare institutions, nor serious people who are socially committed to their work and their role, nor a society that believes in and fosters given identifiers of the personal and professional health to which we aim. The reflections in this proposal embark on a pathway of reflection which, we believe, deserves to be further explored. (shrink)

The first segment starts with a definition of two dimensions of the concept of rule of law; related to the notion of sovereignty and as a concept to control arbitrariness on the part of the ruler. The segment proceeds to give a historical account of the notion and the different stages of its epistemological configuration, from the ancient Greek notion of Eunomia and its incompatibility with the popular rule to the current notion, where the rule of law has become fused (...) with democracy and human rights. The first segment also focuses on the relation between the concept of the rule of law and other principles, such as proportionality, neutrality, and effectiveness. The second segment of the paper analyses the phenomenon of juridification of the rule of law in international treaties and domestic constitutions. It pays particular attention to the role that constitutional accommodation plays in the process of rationalization of the rule of law as a prerequisite to its idealization and mystification. It analyses the reason why this principle is an essential feature of the constitutionalism despite the inner plurality of legal systems. The next aspect, analysed in the third segment of this paper, is the messianic use of the concept of the rule of law. The paper performs a critical definition of messianic, covering a theological perspective and the different theories and concepts that go hand in hand with the idea of the Messiah, such as the “coming”, prophetical and apocalyptical messianism, the phenomena of eschatology, expiation and redemption pictured in Judaism. The segment also covers the secular transplantation of the messianic thought. The last segment is a conclusion returning to the themes identified in the paper and summarises how the messianic thought is applied in the realm of the rule of law. (shrink)

Current nanotechnology regulation is focussed on risks. On the other hand, technical guidelines and other soft law tools are increasingly replacing hard law. This risk reduction approach does not seem to be fully aligned with open principles like sustainable nanotechnology. Indeed, risk optimization tends to be rather a continuous process than a way to settle ultimate lists of risks. There is therefore a need for a more dynamic view: Life cycle assessment contributes to add momentum and context to the models. (...) However, a complementary perspective is here suggested, based on information technologies: nanotechnology platforms. Platforms for nanotechnology governance are supposed to complement and enhance the nano-regulation, adding risk assessment and management. These platforms are mainly offering information, coordination, and context or situational awareness. More recently, some informal platforms appear to play a, certainly limited but still clear, co-regulatory role. Can these informal platforms play a relevant role in nanotechnology governance? In the context of the EU Better Regulation strategy, why not envision some of these informal platforms as future co-regulation tools? The main goal of this paper is to start a discussion on the requirements these informal co-regulatory platforms should fulfill before their hypothetical inclusion in a future better regulation toolbox. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is the variety generated by the class of finite simple bounded BCK-algebras. To obtain these results we prove that every simple algebra in the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is also a relatively simple bounded BCK-algebra. Moreover, we show that every simple bounded BCK-algebra can be embedded into a simple integral commutative bounded residuated lattice. We extend our main results to some richer subreducts of the class (...) of integral commutative bounded residuated lattices and to the involutive case. (shrink)

Con el fin de desentrañar el papel que las más actuales corrientes filosóficas desempeñan en la educación, los autores de este libro parten de un crítico análisis de los acontecimientos de mayo del 68.Se intuyen dos vías de intervención de la filosofía sobre el pensamiento y la práctica educativa: por un lado, la tendencia anti constructivista a los discursos posmodernos, sistémicos y tecnológicos ; por otro, la persistencia del humanismo asentado ahora en el intento de prolongar la modernidad" y en (...) nuevas perspectivas tales como el pacifismo y el ecologismo. (shrink)

We argue that Anderson's (MRH) needs further development in several directions. First, a thoroughgoing criticism of the several alternatives is required. Second, the course between the Scylla of full holism and the Charybdis of structural-functional modularism must be plotted more distinctly. Third, methodologies better suited to reveal brain circuits must be brought in. Finally, the constraints that naturalistic settings provide should be considered.

Des que Ramon Llull va morir fa més de set-cents anys, sempre ha estat present, d’una manera o altra, en la cultura occidental. Fi­lòsofs, teòlegs, historiadors o, fins i tot, arquitectes i científics han partit del seu pensament per a construir noves teories i proveir-se d’eines de treball. Malgrat això, com tot gran personatge, també ha tingut detractors que s’han oposat amb vehemència a la divul­gació dels seus llibres i han arribat a demanar-ne la prohibició. Les aportacions aplegades en El (...) llegat de Ramon Llull mostren vessants diferents tant de l’obra del pensador mallorquí com de la difusió del lul·lisme, en una visió que comprèn múltiples discipli­nes i que obre noves perspectives d’anàlisi. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

Summary José María Albareda (1902–1966) was an applied chemist and a prominent member of the Roman Catholic organization, Opus Dei, who played a crucial role in organizing the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), the new scientific institution created by the Franco regime in 1939. The paper analyses first the formative years in Albareda's scientific biography and the political and social context in which he became an Opus Dei fellow. Then it discusses the CSIC's innovative features compared with the Junta (...) para Ampliación de Estudios (JAE), the institution in charge of scientific research and science policy in Spain from 1907 up to the Civil War (1936–1939). Next it goes into Albareda's ideas about science and science policy. Finally, it shows how they shaped the organization of the CSIC, of which Albareda was the General Secretary from 1939 to his untimely death in 1966. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...) notion of empathy because it is too restrictive, in requiring emotional matching. We conclude that once morality and empathy are properly understood, empathy’s role in morality is vindicated. Morality is not reduced to a form of rational judgment, but it necessarily presupposes pro-social preferences and motivation and sensitivity to inter-subjective demands. (shrink)

Lattice BCK logic is the expansion of the well known Meredith implicational logic BCK expanded with lattice conjunction and disjunction. Although its natural axiomatization has three rules named modus ponens, ∨‐rule and ∧‐rule, we show that we can give an equivalent presentation with just modus ponens and ∧‐rule, however it is impossible to obtain an equivalent presentation with modus ponens as unique rule. In this paper we study and characterize all axiomatic extensions of lattice BCK logic with modus ponens as (...) unique rule. We obtain an infinite chain of proper axiomatic extensions with this property. Moreover, we prove that there is no weakest axiomatic extension of Lattice BCK‐logic admitting modus ponens as unique rule. (shrink)